



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL with CONFIDENTIAL Attachments

September 1, 1982

Dave
NIO/East Asia: Mr. Griesse

Attached is a terrible copy (all we have) of the Haig-Casey correspondence on the role of NIOs in coordinating high level, non-routine briefings. A small working group, meanwhile, has been drawing up implementing instructions in the form of a DCID to be issued shortly.

FYI: In March this year, Under Secretary Eagleburger issued an instruction to all regional assistant secretaries that dealt with procedures for coordinating a broad range of CIA-State activities. We will remind EA that this instruction obliges them to follow these procedures. I doubt that they remember it.

Our people will be looking forward to the session with the briefers when they return from Manilla.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Phil", written in a cursive style.

Philip H. Stoddard

~~CONFIDENTIAL with CONFIDENTIAL Attachments~~

DECL: OADR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

went out 3/24

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you and Cap Weinberger for your support in dealing with a problem which has been vexing at best and which could become serious.

At a time when the new administration's steadfastness, sense of purpose and credibility are at a premium throughout the world--especially with our allies--it is essential that the many voices of the US government convey a coherent and consistent message. Equally important for the success of our foreign policy efforts will be our ability to orchestrate our message so that it reaches the right audience at the right time and in the right tone to embellish our bilateral and multilateral dialogues.

At the moment, as far as I can tell, we have no mechanism or procedure with which to coordinate our special high-level intelligence presentations. This will become an increasingly important consideration as we review vital security issues with our allies, friends and the Soviets. I believe the three of us will be doing ourselves a great service if we can come to grips with this problem.

I know that CIA and other agencies--like various branches of DOD--maintain a routine exchange with various foreign clientele, and I not only encourage this but would like where possible to contribute to it. By the same token, I would

The Honorable
William Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence.

CONFIDENTIAL
RDS-2 3/18/01

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

like to have maximum support from DIA and CIA for State's dialogues. An example, but unfortunately the only one available, of how we might do this, is the series of situation reports on Poland we have been sharing regularly for several months with our NATO allies, which is prepared in State but is expeditiously coordinated and enhanced by CIA, DIA and others.

In view of the importance I think we can all agree this matter warrants, I am asking Ron Spiers to consult with Bobby Inman, Gene Tighe, and other appropriate OSD and JCS representatives as necessary, to see what can be done to gain maximum effect from our high-level presentations. I think at a minimum we should aim to coordinate among the three of us any exchange that would involve presentations of significant US judgments and conclusions to senior foreign officials. This should also apply to presentations on the Hill.

I will appreciate your support in this matter.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10 April 1981

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Al:

I share the view expressed in your letter of 30 March 1981 that we should speak with a single voice on vital security issues both at home and abroad. In particular, given my responsibilities as the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence as well as for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I am concerned that our special high-level intelligence presentations reflect a coordinated view. Such coordination is necessary to insure that what intelligence information is released or disclosed is in the best interests of the U.S. Government, is consistent with our foreign policy objectives, is orchestrated for maximum effect, and does not place in jeopardy sensitive sources or methods.

The existing informal coordination mechanisms which have developed over time are no substitute for a structured, well understood set of procedures designed to insure that all sides are heard from. Given the growing tendency within the recent past to increase both the scope and number of briefings of foreign officials with the use of intelligence to include sensitive compartmentalized information, the prompt development of appropriate coordination procedures is very much called for. In fact, in an exchange of correspondence late last year my predecessor and the then Deputy Secretary of Defense recognized the need for a review of our national intelligence disclosure policies and as a result some preliminary work has been done. However, much remains for us to do.

I believe that the National Foreign Intelligence Board is the proper forum for discussion of this problem and for the establishment of procedures for coordination of national foreign intelligence as well as arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters. I will ask that this matter be tabled for discussion at an early session of NFIB. In the interim, I have instructed NFIB to be especially sensitive to the need to coordinate exchanges involving presentations of significant judgments and conclusions to senior foreign officials.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Cap Weinberger for his information.

Yours,

William J. Casey

cc: The Honorable Casper M. Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense

CONFIDENTIAL